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Introduction 
In his article on “Meaning” for the web-site of the  Linguistic Society of 
America,  William  Ladusaw  (on-line)  distinguishes  between  three  levels  of 
‘meaning’: the semantic one, the syntactic one, and the pragmatic one. The first 
two  levels  are  predominantly  linguistic  in  nature,  the  third,  by  contrast,  is 
predominantly  social  in  nature.  What  interests  us  most  in  this  article  is  the 
pragmatic level. On the pragmatic level: 
[...] our assessment of what someone means on a particular occasion depends not only on 
what is actually said but also on aspects of the context of its saying and an assessment of the 
information and beliefs we share with the speaker (Ladusaw, on-line, bold ours). 
The importance of context, shared beliefs and shared values is highlighted in 
the examples of contextual language understanding that Ladusaw provides as 
illustrations. 
A close examination of most words reveals that they have many different 
senses and the rules which combine them into sentence meanings will frequently 
yield  several  possibilities  for  interpretation.  Usually  we  resolve  potential 
ambiguity unconsciously – unless someone carefully constructs a joke which 
turns  on  an  ambiguity.  Consider  for  example  this  joke,  taken  from  Douglas 
Adams’ The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy. 
(1) Ford and Arthur, are stowaways on a space ship. Ford: You should prepare 
yourself for the jump into hyperspace; it’s unpleasantly like being drunk. Arthur: 
What’s  so  unpleasant  about  being  drunk?  Ford:  Just  ask  a  glass  of  water. 
[Formatted as example by us] 
The passage turns on the ambiguity of the word drunk, which can be an 
adjective, meaning “affected by alcohol”, or the passive form of the verb drink.  
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Arthur takes Ford as intending the first sense of drunk – with good reason: he’s 
unlikely  to  mean  that  someone  would  drink  him.  But  Ford  reveals  that  the 
bizarre interpretation is what he intends. The art of the image is the metaphorical 
treatment of a person as a liquid; the joke turns on the sleight of hand which 
makes our semantic interpreter lean in one direction before pulling us back in an 
unexpected way with a disambiguation. These examples illustrate our semantic 
and pragmatic abilities in action. 
When we engage in this type of discourse, that is, use words with multiple 
meanings  intentionally,  create  metaphors  or  make  a  joke,  the  hearer  either 
‘gets’ the (multiplicity of) meaning(s) intended by the speaker or he or she does 
not – the polysemous, ambiguous or metaphorical utterance ‘falls flat’. There 
are other occasions, however, when hearers manage to ‘hear’ more meanings or 
read  more  meanings  into  a  speaker’s  utterance  than  the  speaker  originally 
intended  (on  most  occasions  this  will  also  have  a  humorous  effect).  For 
example: 
(2) Our eight-year-old son boasted to his friend that he was a really good jumper, 
whereupon the friend replied that that was certainly better than being a really 
good cardigan [...]. 
Hence, in some cases the semantic contents of an utterance might be quite 
deep, have several ‘layers’, so to speak, but there is a danger that the hearer’s 
inferences may stay on the shallow end. In other cases the hearer’s inferences go 
deeper than the original semantic intention of the speaker. The inferential depth 
to which interlocutors plunge depends on the multiplicity of meanings available, 
as well as on the situation and function of the discourse – and, most importantly, 
on the variable linguistic, social, and cognitive skills of the interlocutors. 
Beyond these inevitable individual differences in cognitive ability, social skill 
and semantic sensitivity we find people who are pathologically unable to deal with 
polysemy, ambiguity, metaphors, indirect speech act, in short, with incongruity. 
These people are either adults with a right-hemisphere lesion, autistic children with 
what  some  call  semantic-pragmatic  disorder,  or  children  with  an  early  right-
hemisphere dysfunction. What they lack seems to be quite fundamentally an ability 
to deal with inferential depth, to integrate semantic, contextual, and (social) world-
knowledge, to use context to understand what is meant by what is said. 
We claim that the ability to deal with inferential depth lies at the heart of 
what one could call our semantic/pragmatic/communicative/contextual competence 
or, for short, contextual competence. In this article we want to study how this 
contextual  competence  works  in  ordinary  discourse,  how  it  is  acquired  by 
children, and what happens when it breaks down in autistic children. We shall 
focus in particular on one aspect of contextual competence: our ability to deal 
with  ambiguity,  an  ability  which  is  central  to  the  understanding  of  jokes, 
metaphors and indirect speech acts, for example.  
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Ambiguity in discourse 
It is usual in linguistics to distinguish between structural-syntactic ambiguity 
(The old men and women were leaving) and lexical-semantic ambiguity, which 
can be due to polysemy (Billy prefers to wear light clothes) or homophony (Max 
ran down to the bank). We shall focus here on lexical-semantic ambiguity and 
treat polysemy and homonymy as two poles on the ends of a continuum of words 
and phrases with multiple meanings. 
Ambiguity has been treated in various branches of the arts and humanities. In 
linguistics it has been studied in pragmatics and psycholinguistics, where Grice’s 
maxim of manner urged interlocutors to ‘avoid ambiguity’ and where numerous 
experiments were conducted to see how people disambiguate utterances in context. 
Philosophers have always been aware of the confusions that ambiguity can create. 
In literature, writers of prose dreaded the words ‘ambiguity’ in the margins of 
essays, but ambiguity was cherished by literary critics in their study of poetry. In 
humour  research,  ambiguity  is  studied  developmentally,  cognitively  and 
sociolinguistically  under  the  heading  of  incongruity  resolution  (Raskin  1985). 
Those studying language play also address the positive sides of ambiguity (Crystal 
1998) and we shall follow their lead in this article. 
In linguistics and psycholinguistics it has generally been assumed that: 
 
•  in ordinary discourse, we resist the multiplication of meanings, 
•  that we adhere to the principle of conventionality, that is, that we stick to the 
conventional meaning of words, 
•  that we observe the principle ‘one form – one meaning’, 
•  that  we  observe  the  Gricean  maxim  of  manner:  be  perspicuous,  and 
specifically: avoid obscurity, avoid ambiguity, be brief, be orderly (cf. Grice 
(1975)). 
 
It is also assumed that: 
 
•  words  in  isolation  can  have  more  than  one  meaning,  but  that  words  in 
context always have only one specific meaning; this is traditionally called: 
disambiguation in context. 
 
According to this view, speakers intend words to have one meaning and 
hearers ‘disambiguate’ polysemous words automatically in context. However, 
one can frequently observe that a speaker intends a word (phrase, or sentence) 
to ‘have’ multiple meanings in context or that a hearer notices that a word 
(phrase, or sentence) has more than one meaning (cf. examples 1 and 2). In 
these cases ambiguity is sought, exploited and used quite intentionally (this is 
even more obvious in advertising and headlines).  
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The reason for this may be the evolutionary principle that people who can 
demonstrate that they have a sense of humour, that they have wit, that they can 
juggle with meanings, in short, that they have more linguistic skills than their 
competitors ‘survive’ in the struggle for sexual mates (cf. Miller (2000)), and, 
more mundanely, for social advancement (cf. Dunbar (1996)). We believe that 
the  (humorous)  use  of  ambiguity  and  polysemy,  as  well  as  the  creative 
deployment  of  metaphors  in  conversation  is  the  linguistic  equivalent  of  the 
‘peacock’s tail’ (cf. Miller (2000)). This is illustrated nicely in an extract from a 
humorous book on ‘work’. If you’re only pretending to be smart, the pay is the 
same as if you actually are smart, and nothing can ruin your day. Humour is the 
easiest and safest way to pretend you are smart (Adams 1999). 
Observations of ordinary discourse show that people do indeed not always 
follow the route of the least mental effort, and do not always follow Grice’s 
Maxim of Manner, according to which we have to ‘be perspicuous’ and therefore 
avoid ambiguity. Driven by a new pragmatic principle which we call “Be as 
perspicuous  as  necessary  and  as  conspicuous  as  possible”,  both  speaker  and 
hearer devote a variable amount of mental effort to either exploiting multiple 
levels of meaning conventionally associated with a word or else in enriching the 
meaning of words contextually (cf. Nerlich & Clarke (2001); Nerlich & Chamizo 
Dominguez (1999)). In the following we shall analyse a few more example of 
this process of ambiguation in discourse. 
In the first example the speaker exploits the multiple meanings of get as 
meaning “obtain”, “being in possession of” and as a fossilised part of an idiom. 
As in many other cases this exploitation takes place at the juncture between 
conversational turns: 
(1) A is supposed to have ‘taken’ a video tape from a security office to help a 
friend. B asks her: Have you got it? Whereupon A answers: I have got it all right! 
B asks: Where, show us? A replies: I have got the sack (Coronation Street, ITV).
1 
In the next example the hearer exploits an unintentional polysemy, that is, 
uses  the  highly  salient  idiomatic  meaning  of  an  expression  instead  of  the 
intended  literal  meaning.  In  this  example  the  hearer  actively  disregards  very 
salient contextual clues so as to achieve a humorous effect (cf. also example 2 
for a similar exploitation of a homonym): 
(2) The house is cold and Brigitte says: I have got cold feet and David replies 
laughingly: And what do you have to worry about today, my dear? 
The next exchange is an example of the joint exploitation of a polysemous 
word by speaker and hearer: 
 
1 The examples are all taken from British television, collected in 1998, or else were observed 
in natural discourse, unless otherwise stated.  
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(3) After finishing his work on laying out a patio, A stands up, rubs his back and 
says to B: I am finished [...] physically as well [...] and B butts in by saying 
(laughingly): And you’ll be professionally finished if you go on like this [...] 
(Ground Force, BBC 1). 
In the next example the speaker falls into what we call a ‘semantic trap’ set 
by a polysemous word. Ambiguity is not intended but instantly attributed to the 
utterance. 
(4) After hearing the report of our departmental administrator about the need for 
refurbishing the toilets, our deputy head of department once said: Any movement 
on this issue would be welcome. General hilarity ensued. 
In  the  next  example  the  hearer  exploits  the  hidden  polysemy  of  a  dead 
metaphor,  thereby  exposing  the  underlying  image  schematic  structure  and 
rejuvenating it at the same time. Dead metaphors are actually never really dead 
only in a state of suspended animation! 
(5) A: You should be open-minded about this, really. 
B: [...] but not so much that your brain falls out. 
In the last examples (taken from conversational turns in court) the speaker 
falls into another ‘semantic trap’ set by a polysemous word. 
(6) A: What gear were you in at the moment of the impact? 
B: Gucci sweats and Reebooks. 
(7) A: Is your appearance here this morning pursuant to a deposition notice 
which I sent to your attorney? 
B: No, this is how I dress when I go to work. 
As Jean Aitchison has pointed out: 
We human beings are odd compared with our nearest animal relatives. Unlike them, we can 
say what we want, when we want. All normal humans can produce and understand any number of 
new words and sentences. Humans use the multiple options of language often without thinking. But 
blindly,  they  sometimes  fall  into  its  traps.  They  are  like  spiders  who  exploit  their  webs,  but 
themselves get caught in the sticky strands (Aitchison 1997:80). 
The existence and exploitation of ambiguity and incongruity for communicative 
purposes has a price, however, a communicational/social, as well as a cognitive one: 
ambiguous utterances usually take longer to process. But the positive side of this is 
that  both  meanings  stay  activated  for  a  while,  something  which,  in  turn,  has 
communicational and, may be, benefits (cf. Giora (1997), (in prep.)). 
Rachel Giora has observed that even when there is contextual information 
available  that  would  allow  almost  instant  disambiguation,  speakers  and 
comprehenders sometimes  make use of the  multiplicity of  meanings available,  
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regardless of this contextual information. In these cases contextual information is 
not used to disambiguate words immediately (see example 2) and salient meanings 
are not deactivated, because they have some role in constructing the discourse 
meaning currently being built by the discourse participants. This exploitation of 
ambiguity  is  important  for  the  ongoing  process  of  knitting  conversational 
structures, knitting social relations, and for keeping conversational tedium at bay. 
Keeping several meanings at once in mind may also have cognitive benefits, 
as  it  helps  to  strengthen  the  semantic  bonds  between  the  senses  of  a  word. 
Becoming  highlighted in conversation  they  will  become  more  accessible and 
therefore  more  frequently  used  and usable, thus  more  salient. This  may  also 
contribute to semantic change. However, as we have said, accessing multiple 
meanings may also lead to what we called ‘falling into semantic traps’ and to 
misunderstandings which need to be repaired. 
Being  able  to  weigh  up  the  cognitive  and  communicational  risks  and 
benefits, that is, achieving the right balance between the avoidance of ambiguity 
and the clever use of ambiguity in context, is therefore a most valuable social 
and communicational skill, one that has to be learned, and one that cannot be 
learned by everybody. 
Ambiguity in language acquisition 
The  ability  to  understand  ambiguous  or  polysemous  utterances  does  not 
come out of the blue, but is one of the last stages in a gradual development, as 
the following example of a conversation between mother and child shows (one 
should stress that this developmental process never stops): 
(8) ‘What’s the matter Love? Didn’t he like it at school, then?’ 
‘They never gave me the present.’ 
‘Present? What present?’ 
‘They said they’d give me a present.’ 
‘Well, now, I’m sure they didn’t.’ 
‘They did! They said: “You’re Laurie Lee, aren’t you? Well just you sit there 
for the present.” I sat there all day but I never got it. I ain’t going back there 
again’ (Laurie Lee; quoted by Donaldson (1978:17)). 
As Donaldson writes: 
We  laugh  at  this  misunderstanding for at  least  two  reasons: because  of  the  shock  that 
comes from the sudden recognition of ambiguity where normally we would see none [...] The 
obvious first way to look at this episode is to say that the child did not understand the adult. Yet 
it is clear on a very little reflection that the adult also failed, at a deeper level, in understanding 
the child – in placing himself imaginatively at the child’s point of view (Donaldson 1978:17).  
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So, coping with multiple meanings involves placing oneself imaginatively at 
another  person’s  point  of  view.  How  do  children  acquire  this  ability  to 
‘decentre’, as Donaldson (1978:17) calls it, that is an ability to understand what 
the other knows already, does not know, needs to know for his purposes, wants to 
know for his pleasure? (Donaldson 1978:18) Piaget claimed that children before 
the  age  of  about  7  or  8  cannot  do  this  ‘decentring’  successfully.  However, 
Donaldson claims that we are all egocentric through the whole of our lives in 
some  situations  [see  example  8]  and  very  well  able  to  decentre  in  others 
(Donaldson 1978:25). We shall come back to this type of ‘variation’ in the third 
section of this article when we talk about children and adults who fall outside 
this spectrum of normal variation. 
Normally, children’s understanding of multiple meanings emerges gradually 
and relatively smoothly. It starts with the understanding of the most prototypical 
meaning or most salient meaning of words and goes on to more distant meanings 
(cf. Nerlich, Todd & Clarke (in prep.)). This was demonstrated in the following 
experiment, where Robin Campbell took 24 children between the ages of three 
and five and told them a story from which the following are extracts: 
She would like to work in the big post office but she works in a branch [...] As they were 
driving along they saw a hare run across the field [...] Then they got back into the car and drove to 
the seaside. When they got there they went for a walk along the quay [...] ‘Look at this castle’, said 
Jane’s Daddy. ‘The oldest wing is over 500 years old.’ 
[...] They got held up behind a lot of other cars, all going very slowly. ‘I hope we get out of 
this jam soon’, said Jane’s Daddy. 
The children were asked to draw the hare, the quay, the wing, etc. Many of 
them drew a hair (or a head of hair), a key, a bird’s wing, etc. (cf. Donaldson 
(1978:71)),  demonstrating  that,  despite  the  contextual  clues,  the  majority  of 
children  only  accessed  or  recalled  the  most  prototypical  meaning  of  these 
homophones and polysemes. 
Another  way  of  getting  to  grips  with  studying  children’s  use  and 
understanding of polysemy, apart from such rather artificial experiments, is to 
look at children’s gradual use and understanding of jokes in naturally occurring 
discourse.  As  reported  in  Nerlich,  Todd  &  Clarke  (1998),  Brigitte  observed 
Matthew between age 4.5. and 6.5. 
During  that  time  she  noticed  the  following  (overlapping)  stages  in  the 
development in Matthew’s competence for the production and understanding of 
jokes based on polysemy: 
 
•  At a very early age Matthew, like other children,
2 showed a taste for (arbitrary 
or random) incongruities of any kind (this stage overlapped with pretend play). 
 
2  Other  example  can  be  found  everywhere,  even  in  the  Sunday  newspaper  supplements: 
Owen:  ‘I  know  a  joke.  Happy  birthday  sausage.’ Theo:  ‘Happy  birthday  sausage  pie.’  Owen:  
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Example: What is on top of a fire engine? A tree stump! (Haha). 
 
•  He then acquired the bipartite narrative structure of the joke or riddle (around 
age 4), which he then filled in with more and more acceptable (meaningful) 
incongruities (this stage overlaps with symbolic play). 
Example:  How  do  you  make  flowers  move?  Put  them  on  roller-skates! 
(Comment: Mummy, this is funny because flowers and houses don’t move, 
only humans and animals do.) 
 
•  He finally reached the stage (around age 7) when he could tell, understand 
and create jokes whose resolution was based on the understanding of multiple 
meanings, such as Why is the teacher wearing sun-glasses? Because the class 
is so bright. And even now (September 2000), aged 9, he is not afraid of 
using the semantic knowledge acquired through this joke, when pointing out 
to a taxi-driver, talking about the bright weather, that bright actually has two 
meanings. 
 
Ambiguity can be seen as the crucial point where mind and language meet, 
and its humorous exploitation seems to play an important role in cognitive and 
linguistic development. For Matthew, the acquisition of the bipartite, dialogic, 
question-and-answer format of the joke or riddle was a real Aha-Erlebnis in this 
developmental sequence and must be regarded as a decisive step to enjoying and 
understanding jokes with multiple meanings. It was from that moment onward 
that Matthew used this format over and over again as a test-frame or template for 
the  exploration  of  semantic  space  and,  most  imporantly,  the  exploration  of 
incongruities in language and the world. 
The  important  thing  is  that  at  age  6  Matthew  had  come  to  distinguish 
between what is said and what is meant (in various ways) – and: A child who is 
trying to  figure  out  what other  people  mean  must  be  capable  of recognizing 
intentions in others, as well as having them himself (Donaldson 1978:88). 
But over and above being able to attribute intentions to others, a child must 
also learn how to deal with incongruity, to come to grips with incongruity and 
even  to  seek  it  out  in  a  positive  fashion  (Donaldson  1978:112).  This  is  an 
important step in children’s intellectual and cognitive growth, a step that some 
children  cannot  take.  This  brings  us  to  autism  and  the  difficulties  autistic 
 
‘Happy birthday sausage poo.’ Collapse of audience. We had people falling off their chairs. You 
don’t get that at the Comedy Store. [...] So I suppose I should be grateful to Ella. She delivered her 
joke with such assurance that she commanded complete silence. ‘What do you call a man with no 
name?’  On  the  face  of  it,  this  is  a  very  good  joke;  a  riddle  in  the  classical  style,  possibly 
Shakespearean. The answer, which she delivered without waiting for one, was ‘nonsense’. Which is 
exactly what it was. Ella does not yet understand about jokes. But then none of them does. Which 
was why they fell off their chairs all over again (Passmore 2001:18).  
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children  have  with  understanding  other  peoples’  minds,  intentions,  beliefs, 
emotions, and at coping with incongruity. 
Ambiguity and autism 
It  is  still  not  clear  what  causes  autism,  but  we  know  that  children  with 
autism lack what comes naturally to other children: to pretend-play, to simulate 
other worlds in interaction with others and to understand their real or imaginary 
intentions and utterances. The study of autism could therefore become a window 
onto a type of mind and consciousness that lacks the ability of dealing with 
contextual clues, with ambiguity, with incongruity and with figurative language. 
The  examples  analysed  so  far  illustrate  how  our  semantic/linguistic 
knowledge (including knowledge of the multiple meanings that words can have) 
is  more  or  less  useless  without  being  linked  in  some  way  to  our 
pragmatic/contextual  knowledge,  and  our  knowledge  of  each  other,  which 
includes our knowledge of each other’s mental states and each other’s intentions. 
We can only ‘choose’ the right sense of a word or phrase with multiple meanings 
and therefore understand an utterance when we are able to integrate semantic 
cues  (linguistic  information)  with  contextual  cues  (and  the  inferences  they 
trigger),  and  take  into  account  not  only  the  utterance  but  also  the  utterance 
situation and the mental states we share with our interlocutors.    
Sabbagh has recently pointed out in an article on autism that knowledge of 
communicative  intentions  provides  individuals  with  a  basis  for  constraining 
polysemy in order to reliably arrive at an appropriate meaning of an utterance 
(Sabbagh 1999:45). This ability to constrain polysemy on the basis of contextual 
cues is exactly what autistic people seem to lack. They also lack the ability to cope 
with  fairly  standardised  indirect  speech  acts.  Unable  to  integrate  linguistic 
information with contextual inferences they just do not ‘get the message’. 
The  following  are  two  typical  examples  of  reports  about  the  linguistic 
behaviour of children, one autistic, one with Asperger’s syndrome (an autistic 
spectrum disorder, but unlike children with classic autism, these children have 
fewer learning difficulties and have less problems with language): 
(9) Well-educated people tend to say things like ‘Do you think it would be a good 
idea to put the kettle on?’ Giles couldn’t get the message from me that I was 
talking about having a drink. I had to say ‘We are going to have a cup of tea’. I 
slowly learnt that he needed to know in the simplest terms that the next thing to 
happen was a drink (Sampson 2000:12). 
(10) Taking statements literally is usual – a person with Asperger’s syndrome 
might well feel confused by a comment such as ‘if I eat any more I’ll burst,’ or 
‘time to stretch your legs’ (Dooley 2000:10).  
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It might even be that if you said to an autistic child Put the kettle on, he or 
she would try to wear it, or if you said boil the kettle, he or she would ‘boil’ it, 
that is to say, they would stay on the most literal level of meaning and disregard 
the now conventional metonymic meaning of these speech acts. 
Autistic people seem to have a general difficulty in dealing with ‘incongruity’, 
from creative incongruity as displayed in the use of figurative language and certain 
types of humour up to fairly conventionalised types of incongruity, that is, speech 
acts  which  once  might  have  been  incongruous,  but  now  have  been 
conventionalised. Examples are: What are you up to?, Can you pass the salt?, You 
have  the  devil  in  you,  and  Why  are  you  crying  your  eyes  out? These  are  all 
utterances that certain autistic spectrum children find difficult to understand and 
which might even send them into states of intense anxiety (cf. Welford (1999:8)). 
Unlike  autistic  children,  autistic  adults  feel  this  loss  of  ‘contextual 
competence’  quite  acutely.  The  following  quote  from  a  poem  highlights  the 
autistic’s social and conversational difficulties. 
(11) I talk to people; 
But not with them. 
I see people meandering to and fro; 
But I am not a part of them (http://members.aol.com/autismfg/apfng.html). 
There have been many explanations proposed for the fact that even the most 
able people with autism have difficulties appreciating nonliteral speech, such as 
indirect  requests,  sarcasm,  jokes,  and  metaphorical  expressions  (cf.  Happé 
(1993), (1994); Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen (1999)). The most plausible explanation 
for this type of ‘pragmatic impairment’ has been put forward by Frith and Happé 
(1994). They noted that autistic children are unusually attentive to detail, while 
being relatively uninfluenced – and even maybe unaware of – the larger context. 
They have a tendency to focus on parts rather than wholes and they may find it 
easier than normal people to ignore the context and see through it. This points to 
what Frith and Happé call “weak central coherence”. 
On a similar line, Happé has pointed out that autistic children are well able 
to process individual words but have difficulties in connecting words or objects. 
She also observed that context is not built up so as to allow meaning-driven 
disambiguation. By contrast, central coherence is demonstrated in non-autistic 
people by the ease with which they recognise the contextually appropriate senses 
of  the  many  ambiguous  words  heard  in  everyday  speech  (e.g.  son/sun, 
meet/meat, sew/so, pear/pair) (see Happé (1999:541)). It is possible, then, that 
autism may result from an ‘embarrassment of riches’ at the neural level. This 
translates  into  a  cognitive  system  only  too  well  able  to  distinguish  featureal 
differences at the expense of the ‘big picture’ (Happé 1999:545). 
Baron-Cohen (1997) found that school age children with autism, with a mental 
age equivalent of 6 years, had difficulty seeing that a nonliteral reference (calling a  
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cup “a shoe”) might be a joke. In contrast, normal 3-year-old children expect that a 
speaker’s  intentions  might  be  to  joke  (cf.  Joliffe  &  Baron-Cohen  (1999:395)). 
They expect jokes to happen and are familiar with them. In a recent article Joliffe 
and  Baron-Cohen  replicated  findings  by  Happé  who  had  reported  that  autistic 
individuals find it difficult to deal with pretend play, irony, jokes, white lies, and so 
on. One example of the ‘strange stories’ these people were given to read was: 
Katie and Emma are playing in the house. Emma picks up a banana from the fruit bowl and 
holds it up to her ear. She says to Katie, “Look! This banana is a telephone!” (Joliffe & Baron-
Cohen (1999:405)). 
The researchers noted: 
It seems that the clinical participants had no difficulty in detecting that the statement was at 
odds with the situation, but did have difficulty in giving a contextually appropriate explanation for 
why the character (sic) said what they did (Joliffe & Baron-Cohen 1999:403). 
Autistic individuals seem to be able to comprehend a story like this but they find 
it difficult to integrate comprehended information with higher-level meaning. 
There is still another group of people, apart from autistic individuals who 
find it difficult to deal with these types of incongruence, who find it difficult to 
combine  semantic  information  with  standard  (what  Sabbagh  (1999)  calls 
canonical  and  non-standard  (noncanonical)  inferences). These  are  individuals 
with right-hemisphere damage to the brain. It has been known for at least thirty 
years, that is, since Winner and Gardner and their associates began to study the 
neurological  basis  of  metaphor  understanding,  that  right-hemisphere  damage 
leads  to  an  impairment  in  extracting  meaning  from  context,  especially  when 
word-meaning and context are in conflict (cf. Winner & Gardner (1977)). 
In the following figure we have provided an overview of the various types of 
impairments observed in the three clinical groups who all show deficiencies in 
what we call ‘contextual competence’. 
Figure 1
3 
right-hemisphere lesion 
(adults) 
 
early right-hemisphere 
dysfunction (children) 
semantic-pragmatic disorder 
(children) 
autistic 
1  2  3 
flattened intonation 
no acoustic modulation 
no prosodic variation 
  poor sensitivity to 
communicative situation 
difficulty with more 
conceptual aspects of 
communication 
fail to read for meaning 
fail to make use of 
redundancy 
 
 
3  Based  on  Bishop  &  Adams  (1989);  Shields  (1991);  Welford  (1999);  Giora  (2000); 
McDonald (2000).  
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ignore context and can not 
fill in what is not present in 
the words 
ignore context 
(but: use context to process 
syntax) 
difficulty in assimilating and 
using contextual cues 
 
understand 
literal/conventional meaning 
understand 
salient/conventional 
metaphor 
   
unable to comprehend 
metaphor 
overly literal interpretation of 
words 
make literal interpretation of 
metaphorical statements 
unable to interpret 
metaphors, proverbs, 
idiomatic phrases 
unable to recognize abstract 
relations between words 
unable to appreciate punch 
line of jokes 
have difficulties 
understanding (non-salient) 
sarcasm 
difficulty in dealing with 
incongruity 
unable to understand 
figurative language 
lend literal interpretation to 
figurative language 
difficulty in coping with 
figurative language 
 
unable to comprehend 
humour 
abnormal sense of humour  difficulty in coping with 
humour 
unable to determine when 
conventional meaning does 
not apply 
unable to cope with world of 
fiction, imagination and 
humour 
 
 
 
fail to make use of 
paralinguistic features 
fail to integrate information 
from words with world 
knowledge 
unable to integrate 
multimodal perceptual 
information 
unable to use visual imagery 
fail to make use of 
paralinguistic features 
produce either less 
information than normal 
speakers with the same 
amount of output or more 
speech than normal including 
tangential and confabulatory 
intrusions 
  provide too much information 
unable to use ellipsis where it 
is called for 
doesn’t take turns in 
conversation, and talks at 
you, usually about own 
interests  
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fail to comprehend 
inferential meaning 
unable to deal with 
implicature and inference 
impaired relationship 
between the capacity to 
express themselves in 
language and their 
knowledge of the world 
difficulty in processing 
information about the 
emotional state, intentions, 
and beliefs of the speaker 
fail to understand the 
processes of inference 
fail to deduce the speaker’s 
communicative intention 
fail to bridge the gap between 
surface meaning and the 
deeper levels of meaning 
(speaker’s thoughts) 
fail to comprehend inferential 
meaning 
fail to comprehend implicit 
meaning 
fail to comprehend indirect 
speech acts 
 
The questions that neuropsychologists might want to address are: Is the 
right hemisphere involved in constructing coherence of items in context? Is 
the right hemisphere involved in social understanding? Are these two issues 
linked? Does autism involve a damage to the right hemisphere? What would 
this mean for an understanding of our contextual competence in general? (cf. 
Tirassa (1999)). Cognitive linguists might want to find answers to questions 
such as: What is the role of metaphor (based largely on the integration of 
semantic and conceptual knowledge from different spheres of experience) in 
language and what does an inability to deal with metaphor show us about 
language  and  its  relations  to  other  perceptual,  cognitive  and  social 
‘faculties’? In this article we could only point out how crucial answers to 
these  questions  could  be  for  answering  the  age-old  question:  How  do  we 
understand language? 
Conclusion 
Ohala (1983) once proposed that there are three kinds of linkage between 
language and other entities, abbreviated as “the three m’s”: 
 
•  mind – the psychological dimension, 
•  matter – the anatomical neurological dimension, 
•  manners – the social and cultural dimension. 
 
In this article we have only been able to explore some of the linguistic, 
social and cultural dimensions of contextual competence with some excursions 
into the psychological and neurological dimensions. It is clear however, that 
we  will  only  be  able  to  fully  understand  how  contextual  competence  is 
acquired, used, and sometimes lost if we explore it in the three-dimensional 
space outlined by the three m’s.  
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